

AMERICAN MILITARISM PART II

# THE DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT

"Not a dime left  
for people."



BY CHARLES W. BAILEY AND FRANK WRIGHT  
OF THE MINNEAPOLIS "TRIBUNE" WASHINGTON BUREAU

FOR THE FIRST TIME in 30 years, the American defense establishment is on the defensive.

Not since the 1930's—before World War II, the cold war, the Korean War, Vietnam—have those who build and manage our military machine been seriously challenged.

The argument this year in Washington has been centered mainly on the ABM—the anti-ballistic-missile system that President Nixon proposed to defend our own intercontinental missiles and bomber bases against surprise attack.

But the issue has become much broader: What is the proper place of the nation's defense establishment in the Government and in American society? Has the military machine grown so large that it threatens to throw that society critically out of balance? Once again, critics are raising the specter of the "military-industrial complex"—the shorthand label for that combination of political, military and economic pressures that influence U.S. security policy, military strategy, armed forces and defense spending.

The Vietnam war has dragged on for years, and military victory, despite repeated predictions by the nation's civilian and military leaders, is now admittedly beyond our grasp.

Military spending has grown steadily until it swallows almost \$30 billion a year—more than 40 cents of every dollar in the Federal budget—and requests for new and more costly strategic weapons may offset any savings that would result from a cease-fire in Vietnam.

Pressures are rising for greater Federal outlays to meet the domestic needs of a nation whose multiplying urban problems are compounded by racial, social and economic stresses. The voices of concern do not sing in unison, and most of them recognize both the complexities of the issue and also the high motives of those with whom they disagree. The chorus is rising nonetheless.

"I don't question the patriotism of anyone," says Sen. Mike Mansfield of Montana, majority leader of the U.S. Senate. "But I do question the judgment of creating a military-industrial-labor complex which exercises such great power. You have to control the money—control the spigot—and then you can get into philosophy."

Former Vice President Hubert Humphrey says, "It isn't as if bad men were conspiring against good people. It is that events combine to bring about a preponderant allocation of resources to defense. That preponderance inevitably affects national policies.

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inevitably brings a looseness of control, and feeds on itself."

Walter F. Mondale of Minnesota, a young Democratic liberal in his fifth year in the Senate, sees the issue as one of national priorities: "I've watched every fiscal dividend be dribbled away. There's not a dime left for people. We ought to write a book on ourselves. The first chapter ought to be what we think we are as white people. The rest should be on what we really are and what we do to people who can't defend themselves—the Indians, the blacks, the Mexican-Americans. Then we call them animals because they don't react right after we've beat them flat. If you want to destroy the defensive capacity of our nation, just keep it up the way we've been going. If these young militants on campuses and in the political parties are going to be the leaders—and someday they are—they are not going to be interested in keeping this kind of society together."

John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky, who speaks for anti-ABM Republicans in the Senate, recalls his early efforts to question big defense outlays: "You couldn't find out anything. The Armed Services Committee would say, 'It's classified,' or 'We've gone into this already and have more information than you.'"

Another anti-ABM spokesman, Democratic Sen. George McGovern, knows firsthand the kind of pressures that can be generated. Some of his South Dakota constituents urged him to try to get an ABM site in the state because of the economic benefits it would bring. "I don't think there's any conspiracy between the military and industry," he says, "but it does develop a momentum. Even the clergymen know their congregations are swollen by defense installations. There's a subtle influence on labor unions, business, community groups."

## Secrecy labels stall skeptics who question the propriety or the cost of proposed weapons systems

THE DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT is complex. It is huge. It is also one of the most pervasive institutions in the nation: one out of every ten Americans who works for a living is part of the defense establishment. In the fiscal year just ended, an estimated \$78.4 billion was spent on defense—nearly nine percent of the gross national product.

There are 500 major military installations in the continental United States, and 6,000 smaller ones. The Defense Department controls 45,000 square miles of land—an area the size of Pennsylvania. Overseas, we have 3,400 big and little bases in 30 foreign countries, Hawaii and Alaska.

Some 22,000 U.S. corporations are rated "major" defense contractors, and another 100,000 or so get a piece of the action through subcontracts. One example of the geographic spread of the defense dollar: When Lockheed Aircraft Corp. got the contract to build the C-141 *Starlifter* jet transport for the Air Force, it bought parts and services from 1,200 other firms. Just one small part for the plane—a fuel-pump switch—required material from New York, Connecticut, Illinois, Ohio, California, Wisconsin and Massachusetts.

The major share of defense spending—\$44 billion last year—goes for weapons and other equipment. Two-thirds of that went to the 100 biggest defense contractors, and a whopping one-quarter of the total—\$11.6 billion—was paid out to these ten: General Dynamics, Lockheed, General Electric, United Aircraft, McDonnell-Douglas, American Telephone & Telegraph, Boeing, Ling-Temco-Vought, North American Rockwell and General Motors.

Even the university campus can be a big defense contractor. Last year, both MIT and Johns Hopkins University were among the top 100.

Some states do better than others. California got one out of every seven defense-procurement dollars last year—or \$6.5 billion. Texas was second with \$4.1 billion. The rest of the top ten are: New York, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, Indiana.

How did it all start? And how did the defense establishment get so big? There are many reasons for its growth—but only one for its birth: We live in a dangerous world.

At the end of World War II, the nation rushed—as it had after every

war—to dismantle its armed forces and turn its attention to the search for the good life. Suddenly, however, the U.S. faced an unprecedented military and ideological challenge. The Soviet Union sought to expand its dominion westward across Europe and southward into Iran, Turkey and Greece. In Asia, another Communist government came to power in a bitter civil war in China. The United States hesitated—and then, in an extraordinary series of basic policy decisions, moved to check the Communists. The rationale was "containment," which came to mean a U.S. commitment to meet, if necessary with armed force, any Communist encroachment on independent nations that asked for our help. This required our nation for the first time to maintain a large peacetime military force.

Beyond this, there was another reason for the pyramiding growth and cost of defense: atomic bombs, hydrogen bombs, jet airplanes and, finally, intercontinental missiles made the tools of war astronomically costly. The complexities of these weapons dictated years of research and development before they could be ready. Their capacity to strike a single, sudden, devastating blow meant that a nation committed by political decision to constant readiness for conflict could no longer wait until war began to beat its plowshares into swords.

There are other reasons—some of them unrelated to either high policy or the march of science—why defense spending has grown. Neither Congress nor the White House has been able to find ways of exercising anything like the critical scrutiny that is routinely applied to much smaller domestic programs. Many congressmen are reluctant to vote against anything for "our boys in service." Secrecy labels applied to many projects hinder those who do raise questions. Finally, there is "pork"—the economic benefits that defense spending can bring to a community.

There are positive factors too. By and large, the Pentagon and its industrial allies have done all they can to encourage congressional permissiveness. This year, there are 339 Defense Department employees assigned to "legislative liaison"—the bureaucratic euphemism for lobbying. That works out to two Pentagon agents for every three members of Congress; no other special-interest group comes close to having so many.

Defense Department lobbyists don't limit themselves to pushing the Pentagon's legislative program. They also spend much of their time currying favor with congressmen in other areas—passing advance word of contract awards so members can get political credit for "announcing" them, or handling inquiries about the problems of constituents in service.

They also give special attention to congressmen who hold major influence over defense affairs. The South Carolina district of Chairman L. Mendel Rivers of the House Armed Services Committee is chock-full of Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps bases. Georgia—home of Sen. Richard B. Russell, for years, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and now head of the Appropriations Committee—is loaded with armed services installations and defense industry. The congressional military barons get some personal benefits too. The Air Force routinely provides planes from its "VIP" fleet to ferry them around the country. And one night this spring, the Defense Department not only turned out its top brass for a Mississippi testimonial dinner for Chairman John Stennis of the Senate Armed Services Committee but also flew in the entertainment—a Navy choir from Florida, an Army wac band from Alabama and an Air Force string ensemble from Washington, D.C.

If the Pentagon can bring heavy pressures and blandishments to bear on Congress, the defense industry—companies and unions alike—can exert massive leverage on both. Its lobbyists, ranging from high-priced vice presidents to clerks, do most of their work in private, staying out of public debate over weapons systems or budgets.

Industry's influence in Congress is sometimes magnified by outside help—from chambers of commerce, state and local officials or labor unions eager to impress on congressmen the benefits of defense bases or contracts. A study two years ago of 27 firms slated for prime contracts on the ABM suggests the potential for this kind of pressure: the firms operate more than 300 plants in 172 congressional districts spread across 42 states. Thus, at least 256 senators and representatives had some economic stake—direct or indirect—in the ABM. A recent estimate that 15,000 firms, including subcontractors and suppliers, would share in ABM spending suggests that the impact is even broader.

At the Pentagon, several factors combine to bolster industry's standing. First, the growing complexity of modern weapons has made it ever

harder for Government to keep its provisioners at arm's length. No longer does a service simply decide what it wants, design it, and then advertise for somebody to build it; now, industry's "ass men"—strategic-systems salesmen—and engineers play a major role in military-weapons design.

Industry and the military join hands in other ways too. There are the service associations, to which active and retired officers as well as industry representatives belong. The groups are large (the Air Force Association counts 100,000 members) and often rich—upwards of \$2 million yearly income in some cases, with industry providing much of it through dues and advertising in association magazines that advocate bigger and better weapons.

Another factor is the ease with which some men move from defense industry to the Defense Department, and vice versa. Secretaries of Defense, and lesser officials, have come from industry, and returned to it. Retired military officers flock to defense industry, often going to work for a firm whose operations they had monitored while on active duty.

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**"No other part of our society functions with so little check and balance" as the Department of Defense.**

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**W**HEN INDUSTRY AND THE PENTAGON go hand-in-hand to Congress, they find powerful friends awaiting them. A few senior members control congressional action on military matters; four committee chairmen—all Southerners, all conservatives, all well along in years, all with over 20 years of service—make up the elite:

Rivers, 63, a congressman for 28 years, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.

George Mahon of Texas, 63, a congressman for 34 years, chairman of the House Appropriations Committee.

Stennis of Mississippi, 63, a senator for 21 years, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Russell, 71, whose 36 years of service make him the Senate's senior member, chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee.

These men are strong and talented in their own right. But the primary source of their power lies in the seniority system, in the way members are chosen for advancement, and in the structural and jurisdictional tradition of Congress.

The Southern flavor of the defense positions—one official calls it "the South's revenge in perpetuity for Gettysburg"—is a self-feeding process. Warm weather and ease of year-round operation lead the military to spend much of its money in the South. Members of Congress from Dixie therefore gravitate to the committees that deal with military affairs, and because it is relatively easy for them to get reelected, they build up seniority and thus control the committees.

This process is even more marked in the Senate, where the smaller membership allows senators to serve on more than one major committee. The result has been the creation of interlocking directorates; the three top-ranking members of Armed Services—Stennis, Russell and Republican Margaret Chase Smith of Maine—are also on Appropriations. Such dual memberships and parallel inclinations almost always produce the same result: Armed Services approves Pentagon proposals and Appropriations provides the money to finance them.

There are more personal ties to the Pentagon too. Two members of the Senate Armed Services Committee hold commissions as major generals in the Reserve forces, a third is a retired two-star Reserve general. The man who writes the military-construction appropriation bill each year—Rep. Robert L. F. Sikes of Florida—is a major general in the Army Reserve. A 1967 Minneapolis *Tribune* survey of the entire Congress turned up 32 senators and 107 representatives with Reserve commissions.

One reason military committees generally have their way is the system itself; if you attack the other fellow's committee on the floor, he may do the same to yours. Armed Services and Appropriations members defend their bailiwicks with relentless zeal against either individual attack

or jurisdictional raids by other committees. The bulk and complexity of programs, the frequent censoring of reports and hearings records for "security" reasons, and the traditionally one-sided nature of the testimony that is published—all these also inhibit opposition to military outlays.

The debate on the defense establishment has been highlighted this year by a new round of "horror stories" about Pentagon mismanagement and inefficiency: a \$2 billion increase in the cost of a new giant jet transport; the belated cancellation of a contract for a new helicopter that was badly flawed. Such disclosures of waste are only ancillary to the basic issues in the rising debate over the proper role and size of the nation's defense establishment. But saving a billion here and a billion there has its merit—especially in the light of the military's post-Vietnam "shopping list" of new and even more costly weapons.

The new weapons list is long and varied. It includes a replacement for the Minuteman missile, now the backbone of our strategic force; multiple warheads to boost the striking power of missiles; a long-range bomber to replace the B-52; fighter planes for the Navy and Air Force; three nuclear-powered aircraft carriers at a half-billion dollars each. There are dozens of others.

All of these systems would cost money. But critics argue that some of them—especially the Multiple Independently-targeted Reentry Vehicle (MIRV), as the multiple-warhead project is called—could also seriously escalate the U.S.-Soviet arms race. To some in Congress and elsewhere, MIRV is a greater menace than the ABM.

The case of MIRV points up the critical importance of how decisions are made on whether or not to build a weapons system. The crucial decisions are made, in the end, by only one man: the President. But the coinage of presidential actions is often minted long before it is issued by the White House. Proposals for foreign and defense policy, for military strategy and for the spending to implement them come to the President's desk from many sources: the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Council, the Budget Bureau, the Congress. Policy-making decisions should, in theory, flow in an orderly sequence: first, basic foreign policy, defense policy to support it, military strategy to implement defense policy, military forces to carry out the strategy; finally, budget decisions to pay for the forces. But, in fact, it sometimes goes the other way: money decisions determine force levels, these in turn affect strategy, strategy influences defense policy—and defense policy then dictates foreign policy.

One man who served two Administrations in a top national-security role puts it this way: "What is needed is a counter to the parochially presented programs and decisions of the Defense Department. No other part of our society functions with so little check and balance. This is not a plot—it is the failure of the rest of our society to develop the expertise to permit reasoned decisions on basic policies."

Can this be done? Many people who know the problem firsthand are gloomy. But the effort is going to be made. A half-dozen proposals for study of the defense structure, and its implications for future national policy, are under way or about to start—including several in the Defense Department itself. The suggestions cover the waterfront and include privately financed research centers to review programs, a new joint Senate-House committee with a strong grant of authority to review national priorities, a new independent defense-review office to analyze military spending, expansion of the Budget Bureau's staff. Some think that a determined, open fight will have to be made on the floor of the House and Senate over every major defense issue.

Even with much stronger congressional control, the President will have the key role. "The question in defense spending is 'how much is necessary?'" President Nixon said in June. "The President of the United States is charged with making that judgment."

Still, questions of costs and priorities persist. None of the answers will come easily, especially in a world where nations build great military forces not to make war but to deter it—a world where weapons are built, as one scholar suggests, "not to be used but to be manipulated."

But however hard the questions, they are at least being asked, some for the first time in 20 years, some for the first time ever. Upon the course of the debate that has just barely begun, and upon the kind of answers that emerge, may depend the place of the United States in the next decades—or the next century.

# THE POWER PEOPLE

**GEN. EARLE G. WHEELER**  
Chairman,  
Joint  
Chiefs of Staff

HE WAS IN civilian clothes, a medium-blue suit, white shirt, dark tie and, surprisingly, a bright-red breast-pocket handkerchief. As we settled around the coffee table in his big, austere office at the Pentagon, I told him, "I've just been reading a speech of yours about your pride in your uniform, and here I find you in mufti." He chuckled, lit up one of the filtered cigarettes he just about chain-smokes, and said, "I don't always wear my uniform, but I love it."

Gen. Earle G. "Bus" Wheeler, 61, is six-foot-one-inch tall, slim, strong-jawed, quiet and articulate, parts his dark hair in the middle. A West Pointer, he has been Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for five years and was Chief of Staff of the Army for two years before that. When I told him LOOK wanted his views on the military-industrial complex controversy, he took off without further prompting:

"Our military leadership has always been fair game for criticism in our free and free-swinging society. And I wouldn't have it any other way. The great majority of the senior officers I have known and respected have always had a common characteristic—a tough skin and a high boiling point. However, there has crept into the current debate a note, or perhaps more precisely a chorus, that calls into question, and indeed twists, the motivation of leadership of our armed forces. And in the assorted bag of anti-military noises, some distortions have occurred. Take President Eisenhower's 'Farewell Address to the American People' on January 17, 1961. I believe that in the context of that time—and taken as a whole—that address was a wise, prudent and balanced assessment of the dangers and opportunities confronting the American people at the end of General Eisenhower's eight years as President. I want to emphasize—in the light of the current discovery by some people that they are living in a 'military-industrial complex'—that I said, 'taken as a whole.' What the critics quote is this passage: 'In the councils of Government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence,

whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.'

"What the critics leave out are these passages: 'We face a hostile ideology—global in scope, atheistic in character, ruthless in purpose and insidious in method. Unhappily the danger it poses promises to be of indefinite duration. To meet it successfully there is called for, not so much the emotional and transitory sacrifices of crisis, but rather those which enable us to carry forward steadily, surely and without complaint the burdens of a prolonged and complex struggle—with liberty the stake. . . . A vital element in keeping the peace is our military establishment. Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk his own destruction. . . . We can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense. We have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions.'

"It seems clear to me that what President Eisenhower was saying was that, because the threat continues, we must maintain the power to deter war over a long and difficult period of time, and that he regrets, but clearly accepts, the need for a substantial peacetime defense industry. I agree with the validity of the concerns set forth by President Eisenhower. My position differs, however, from those who choose to be selective in their recollection. I agree with the address in its entirety."

General Wheeler said he is convinced that President Nixon's decision to deploy Safeguard anti-ballistic missiles to protect Minuteman ballistic-missile sites is in line with President Eisenhower's call for keeping our arms "ready for instant action." And he said he is just as sure that the military-industrial relationship was necessary because of modern technology and that it certainly is not a "malignant, semiautonomous, conspiratorial grouping dedicated to foisting off unneeded weapons on our fellow countrymen."

"If I'm in a conspiracy," he said, "I have yet to meet my fellow conspirators."

One fact to keep in mind, he added, is that the same technology that serves American arms also is in the hands of the Soviet Union and, if not today, then soon, within the grasp of Communist China. The oceans, he said, not only no longer offer protection but provide instead "an avenue for the enemy."


"Some people may like to wish away the problem by refusing to think in the terms demanded by the advanced technological age. But my colleagues and I on the Joint Chiefs of Staff can permit ourselves no such retreat from the real world. The threat is real. It would be naïve to think otherwise. That is not to say there will be nuclear war tomorrow, but the threat is very real. Remember, our job is to deter war, not primarily to fight one. We are bound by duty to arm our country so that if a war should come through some miscalculation, we would have the weapons and the resources to prosecute it successfully."

The General had smoked himself through several filter tips by then, and I noticed that my allotted time with him was running out. He had a Joint Chiefs' meeting coming up within minutes. But he kept on talking, and I hung in: Hadn't the world situation changed since Eisenhower's time? Hadn't the myth of the mono-



lithic Russia-Red China-Eastern Europe bloc been demolished by bitter Sino-Soviet hassling and drifts toward independence from Moscow in Eastern Europe?

"The situation is not as clearly defined now as it once was, but there still exists a free world and a non-free world," he said. "The Chinese and the Soviets were once hand in glove. This is no longer the case. But the fact that they like each other less does not mean they like us more. The Soviets, with their Eastern European allies, are still a formidable power. Remember, the Eastern Europeans are right under the Soviet gun. The leadership in those countries is



ILLUSTRATIONS BY ROBERT GROSSMAN

when the Vietnam war ended? Could any of the savings be diverted to urgent domestic programs?

"We have had to defer necessary items, due to the Vietnam war," he replied. "The Navy has suffered the most in hold-downs on new ships and ship conversions, for example. In the Army and Air Force, we have had to draw down on our stocks, and they will have to be built up again. But that is not to say that we in the military are unmindful of the necessary, even critical, programs that require heavy budgeting in the social area."

What would be his reaction to the creation of a watchdog committee of scientists and other leading citizens, as suggested by economist John Kenneth Galbraith, to keep an eye on the Pentagon?

"It seems to me," General Wheeler said, "they would endeavor to put themselves in the place of the President and the Congress, both already charged with that responsibility under the Constitution. I don't regard Mr. Galbraith's or any other such group as representative of the people but only of a segment of the population. I think the framers of the Constitution were very wise in making the President the commander in chief, giving him overall control and direction of the armed forces, together with his foreign-policy responsibilities. No group today could substitute for the watchdog activities of the Congress and the President. They know where the people want to go. I wouldn't have it any other way." WARREN ROGERS

beholden to the Soviet Union—long-term, hard-core Communists tied in with Moscow."

I brought up what critics call an unhealthy trend—so many high-ranking military officers, upon retirement, going into top jobs in defense industries.

"I think there are very few indeed who try to take advantage of their former positions in the military to sell us defense products," the General said. "During my five years in this job and my two years as Chief of Staff of the Army, only on one occasion have I had a retired officer come in and talk to me about anything to do with business. He told me he was having trouble getting a yes-or-no response from the Army and asked me to give him the name of somebody to contact. I gave him a name, and that was that. Most officers are not salesmen. A friend of mine who retired and went into industry told me, 'The idea of my going back and trying to peddle products on the basis of my military friendships is so repulsive to me that I would rather starve to death.' And so would I."

What would happen to the defense budget if and

## ROGER LEWIS President and Chairman of the Board, General Dynamics

GENERAL DYNAMICS CORPORATION is the biggest defense contractor of them all. Its president, a tall, wiry, energetic man of 57 named Roger Lewis, wants to keep it that way. Since 1962, when he took charge of a company sliding toward bankruptcy, and through the years of ups and downs since then, he has clung to this definition of his company's role: "To maintain surveillance of the exploding science and technology of our day and to apply them in the long term to the security of our country in the least time and at the least cost possible."

Lewis is the kind of business executive who always seems to have a bag packed and an airplane waiting. A native of Los Angeles and a 1934 graduate of Stanford University, he got into the business in the sheet-metal shop of Lockheed. He worked up the executive escalator at Lockheed, Canadair Limited, Curtiss-Wright and—after being an Assistant Secretary of the Air Force in the first two and a half years of the Eisenhower Administration—Pan American World Airways, before General Dynamics beckoned.

Interviewed in his spacious but not overpowering office in the General Dynamics Building in Rockefeller Center, Lewis was in shirt-sleeves and eager once again to define and defend his role:

"We are a very specialized organization. Twenty percent of our personnel are engineering people. For

some time, about 80 percent of our total sales have been to the Government, most of it to the Department of Defense. We primarily design and develop big weapons systems—combat aircraft, nuclear submarines, surface ships, strategic and tactical missiles—and we also build communications and data-handling equipment. We are proud to have played a significant role in the development of the first American satellite, the first supersonic bombers, the first nuclear submarines and the first intercontinental ballistic missiles.

"Increasing technology has been the controlling factor in military power, from the *Monitor* and the *Merrimac* to *Polaris*. Our job is to get the most military security from this technology, to automate defense as much as possible and thereby reduce the risk of human life and the cost of manpower. A B-36 bomber required a combat crew of 11; the new F-111 has a crew of two, who deliver firepower more accurately using electronic and computerized systems."

Lewis spoke deliberately, unhurriedly, with conviction but without heat. I asked him about the military-industrial complex: How did he see it, and how did he read Eisenhower's words on the subject?

"Few people seem to remember," he said, "that President Eisenhower was not criticizing the existence of the so-called military-industrial complex. He was cautioning against, in his words, 'the acquisition of unwarranted influence' by it. With that, I think, all Americans can agree."

"I don't see anything improper in the relationship between the military and industry. We don't have a government like those of prewar Germany and Japan. Further, there are tens of thousands of companies doing defense work, and numerous echelons of authority both within the executive branch and within the Congress that must study and approve procurement policies and actions. And it is all done through the free-enterprise system: The competition is severe, the risks great, the profits generally lower than in commercial practice."

Lewis said he saw no evidence that defense spending was altering the American political system. But he said it was a good question, world conditions being what they are and defense "getting the most money, the most attention and the most publicity."

"But I place my confidence in America's history and tradition of concern that the military not be dominant in our political life, that our Founding Fathers were right when they separated the powers of the Government, provided for civilian control of the military and insured freedom of speech and freedom of the press," he said. "It is in this climate that the free-enterprise system can operate so effectively to contribute greatly to the preservation of the kind of government we have. And it is this climate that should quiet fears that companies like ours have a vested interest in preserving the cold war. The executive branch determines policy, the Defense Department devises the strategy, Congress provides the money, and industry does its job in a tough, competitive atmosphere. All of this public interest is healthy, however, and is to be welcomed."

A major part of the controversy, I pointed out, has to do with costs, contracts awarded without competitive bidding, "overruns" on original contracts.

"You have to secure defense in a way that costs the least and gives the most. I don't know of a better

continued

## POWER PEOPLE CONTINUED

system than the one this country has. Contracts are drawn up on the basis of what is known, but technology changes so fast that there are often necessary design and component changes in the eight to ten years it takes to turn designs into hardware. Increases in costs usually result not from a lack of competition or inaccurate estimating, but from rapidly changing technology and other factors, like inflation. Government contracts are the most god-awful examined documents, subject to scrutiny infinitely greater than in other fields. I'm not objecting. I think that's the way it should be."

WARREN ROGERS

## REP. L. MENDEL RIVERS Chairman, House Armed Services Committee

LUCIUS MENDEL RIVERS ranks up there with the great logrollers, and he doesn't particularly resent the label, saying, "Why, I'm proud to help my people." The district he represents in Congress, the southeast corner of South Carolina, slopes off into swampy lowlands and then into the Atlantic. Geologists say the topography has been like that for millennia, but to anyone passing through, it looks as though the area is sinking under the weight of military installations.

Rivers' district contains a great deal. In no special order there are: the Charleston Army Depot, the Charleston Naval Station, Charleston Shipyard, Charleston Naval Hospital, Beaufort Naval Hospital, Charleston Naval Supply Center, Charleston Naval Weapons Station, Charleston Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarine Training Center, Charleston Polaris Missile Facility Atlantic, the Marine Corps Air Station in Beaufort, the Marine Corps Recruit Depot at Paris Island, and Charleston Air Force Base. In districts immediately adjacent are the Myrtle Beach Air Force Base, Shaw Air Force Base in Sumter, and Fort Jackson in Columbia.

"Without bragging," Rivers once bragged, "I can say that I have sponsored 90 percent of the military installations in this state." Not all of the above bases were actually brought in by Rivers (at least one was built the year he was born), but in 28 years on the House Armed Services Committee and one of its predecessors, the Naval Affairs Committee, he has overseen expansion of the old ones, helped attract the new and, when cutbacks threatened, kept what was there. "Mendel Rivers fights harder than any other congressman I know of on anything affecting his district," one Pentagon official has said.

As the voters of South Carolina's First Congressional District are well aware, there's more. Defense contractors have increasingly come to appreciate the advantages offered by plant sites in the area. During the four years since Rivers became committee Chairman, factories have been built by General Electric, Avco, Lockheed, McDonnell Douglas, and J. P. Stevens. United Aircraft plans a new helicopter plant in Charleston for the near future. Some of these companies have moved in on their own, some with

specific encouragement from Rivers (of Lockheed, Rivers has chuckled, "I asked them to put a li'l old plant here"); all benefit from Government contracts. Taken together, the business of defense—military and industrial—accounts for something like 55 percent of the region's payrolls.

"In appearance and manner," wrote one Washington reporter, "Rivers is a Hollywood director's ideal of a Southern congressman. He wears his hair long on the back of his neck, as did his state's famed Sen. John C. Calhoun. . . . [He] is an eloquent, florid orator of the old school. . . ."

"My people are grateful that I've brought work into the area," Rivers said recently. Leaning back in his chair, he waved expansively toward his constituency five hundred miles to the south. "As I've said many times, they are more interested in my producing record than in my attendance record. [Rivers' long and luxurious junkets to military bases around the world have been hit by syndicated columnists and editorial writers.] What my people want is prosperity. They want jobs. Money. And that's what I've brought them."

He brings his people all these benefits because he is arguably the single most important man in today's defense establishment. He is the broker who puts it all together.

For the military, he legislates generous pay increases (in 1965, he simply doubled the Johnson Administration's proposed pay boost and pushed it through), allots funds for all major armament, tanks, planes and ships and provides all housing. He is judged to be a soft touch when it comes to distributing the taxpayer's money, frequently pressing more on the services than they request. On the House floor, he has remarked that men in uniform "don't have a lobby like some of the other people have. The only lobby they have is the Committee on Armed Services." He means it.

For the Administration, Republican or Democratic, he rules on draft policy and determines the spending of around \$80 billion a year, nearly half the Federal budget. The Armed Services Committee—with 40 members, one of the largest legislative committees in Congress—must authorize all defense expenditures. Its Chairman, as such things work out on Capitol Hill, "has at least one hundred times the power of . . . the balance of the committee," according to one of its members. So it is Rivers that the President and Secretary of Defense deal with.


For fellow congressmen, he doles out help of various sorts. Every representative gets letters from his constituents about their children in the service. It helps if they can see Rivers. Many have defense-related plants or bases in their districts, some in danger from cutbacks. See Rivers. All have to run campaigns every two years, and if Rivers—or a recognized proxy, like Rep. F. Edward Hébert of Louisiana—shows up at a fund-raising dinner, so do big businessmen bearing big checks. It makes sense in so many ways to stay on his good side.


For industry, he smooths the path to Government contracts, and, should something go wrong, he acts as a powerful guardian angel—as he did recently when Lockheed came in for criticism on both the overrun of costs on the massive C-5A transport and the mechanical problems holding up production (and

jacking up the price) of the Cheyenne helicopter. When criticism of the helicopter mess grew loud, he launched a counterattack rather than an investigation, and topped it off by persuading Speaker John McCormack to descend from the rostrum to say, "Where the national interest of our country is concerned, if I am going to err in judgment, I would rather err on the side of strength. . . . I am willing to follow the leadership of the gentleman from South Carolina." As it happened, the Army finally threw up its hands and canceled the Cheyenne because of all the problems—but it is fairly clear that, for as long as they had wanted it, Rivers could make sure that they would get it. He has, in short, something for everyone. Remarkably, although 61 members of Congress disclosed deep financial interests in defense contractors earlier this year, Rivers (according to the *Wall Street Journal*) had almost none. Still, there are other ways people can show their gratitude.

Visit Charleston and you can see the L. Mendel Rivers Postal Annex and Men-Riv military housing project and Rivers Avenue (Route 52) leading out to Rivers Gate at the Charleston Air Force Base. A library, soon to be built, will also be named in his honor.

Endless ceremonies are arranged by businessmen and the military, often coordinated by the staff of the Armed Services Committee. When a larger-than-life bust of the Congressman atop a seven-foot shaft overlooking Rivers Avenue was dedicated in October, 1965, the three Secretaries of Army, Navy and Air Force were present, as was the director of the CIA (also funded through Rivers' committee), not to mention a host of other brass, Charleston defense contractors, colleagues from Congress, and numer-





able leadership..."), the Secretary of Defense ("Mr. Chairman . . . on this day in which you are so uniquely and signally honored, I am proud to call you my friend."), the Speaker of the House ("... a great man, great because of his love of God and his love of country..."), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, plus, almost like clockwork, the three service Secretaries and the director of the CIA again.

Two weeks later, Armed Forces Day was changed to L. Mendel Rivers Day in Greenville, S. C. The Director of Selective Service, Gen. Lewis B. Hershey, dropped by to be seen with the Chairman, and there was a nice telegram from the President.

Closest to home, the commander of the Charleston Naval Supply Center issued an invitation to a number of locally prominent Negroes, offering to show them around the installation. During the tour, he made an enthusiastic speech about Rivers' importance to the area. In case the message needed underlining, George Payton was among those in the group.

All this, and the explicit support of local contractors, was probably unnecessary: on primary day, Rivers took almost 80 percent of the tally, and Payton himself admitted that he probably didn't get much more than half of the potential Negro vote.

People do Rivers favors of a more practical nature as well. No president of a major airline can command better service than Rivers gets from the military. From the time when he was only number two on Armed Services (but clearly heir apparent to Georgia's Carl Vinson), he has been ferried back and forth between Washington and Charleston in Air Force planes—and carried around the world whenever an inspection tour has suited him.

On *Meet the Press* two years ago, Rivers denied using military planes for private purposes. When his questioner persisted, Rivers replied heatedly that, "under the law, as chairman of the Committee, I don't have to account to anyone, whenever I consider a trip—like the President of the United States or the Secretary of Defense." This year, Rivers arranged for five of the committee's \$15,000-a-year secretaries to take a two-week, all-expenses-paid vacation abroad on what one committee member frankly called the "phony pretext" of a military-housing study.

All these perquisites, and all this power, must be heady wine for the son of a dirt farmer and turpentine-still owner from a town called Gumville, near Hell Hole Swamp, S. C. Rivers' father died when Mendel was eight, and the succession of jobs he worked at before he got to high school ranged from milking cows to working in an asbestos mill. He went to college "just long enough to get to law school and went to law school just long enough to get my degree." Soon a state legislator, he was elected to Congress in 1940 after a primary in which the local Democratic machine's candidate had a German name—an unfortunate matter of timing that Rivers exploited for all it was worth.

With the exception of a highly vocal campaign he ran in the late forties to repeal the special tax on oleomargarine (his district produces soybean oil), Rivers' career in Washington has turned entirely on his unwavering interest in, and support of, military affairs. It is perhaps noteworthy that he himself has never been in uniform.

Rivers' views on foreign affairs tend toward the

simplistic. The armies of Franco's Spain, he once said, were "the greatest allies we ever picked up." In 1950, he urged Truman to threaten North Korea with atomic attack. A decade later, he urged Eisenhower to invade Cuba. In 1965, he proposed a preemptive first strike on China's nuclear plants. In Vietnam, he has been for letting the military men fight without restraints imposed by civilians. His reaction to the capture of the *Pueblo*, as he recounted it 24 hours later, was quick and to the point: "I would have gone to war yesterday."

Domestic issues he sees in equally stark contrasts. He has ardently supported the House Committee on Un-American Activities (now called the Internal Security Committee), and he backed his good friend and right-hand man, Representative Hébert, when the Louisiana congressman said the nation should "forget the First Amendment" to the Constitution, which guarantees free speech, in order to jail people like Stokely Carmichael and the late Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. After all, said Rivers, the choice was clear: it was between "Jesus Christ . . . and the hammer and sickle." In the fall of 1968, he tacitly supported George Wallace for President.

Yet occasionally, Rivers had departed from the role of a rockbound Southern conservative, in votes on nonmilitary matters. Last year, for example, he supported a bill to liberalize the Federal food-stamp program, which he had voted for at its inception several years ago. Indeed, he went along with much of the Johnson Administration's poverty efforts.

Even those who disagree with his right-wing views and deplore his methods agree that Mendel Rivers is dedicated to his job. "The Chairman works harder than any congressman I know," said one man who finds little else to admire. "Yes, that's right, I do work hard," said Rivers, clearly pleased to hear of the praise. "I'm up and out on the road by 6:30, and I'm never in the office later than 7:00 a.m. I almost never leave the office before 7:00 or 8:00 at night. I don't like parties, so I normally go straight home."

(Without exception, all the committee members interviewed were irritated by reports branding Rivers a chronic drunk. "He's an alcoholic who had a problem but has managed to contain it," said an otherwise critical congressman. "I've seen him drunk only once or twice—less often than most of us.")

The greatest charge against Rivers is abuse of power. "Rivers uses [his] power ruthlessly," said one committee member. "He holds hearings only on bills he wants heard—mostly his own bills. He chops down civilian witnesses he doesn't like and encourages the military witnesses he does like. Those of us who have occasionally opposed him have never won a round. We haven't succeeded in getting a single amendment out on the floor for a vote."

"The most serious problem in this Government," said another committee member, "is that pro-military, conservative, parochial congressmen like Mendel are in charge here. They work closely with the military—which also has a disproportionately high number of small-town Southerners among the top brass—and with the defense industries. They all scratch each others' backs. The whole thing gets terribly incestuous—so much so that in this dangerous area, where checks and balances are most needed, we have almost none at all." ROBERT YOAKUM



## MELVIN LAIRD

### Secretary of Defense

MEL LAIRD? Secretary of Defense? At the very idea, anxiety mushroomed. Such was his reputation as a hot-eyed militarist, such his image as a combative Republican congressman, one given to sneering at "mere biological survival," one who insisted that "limited use of nuclear weapons will have a very important role to play in the future." In the House seat his central Wisconsin district awarded him for 16 years, Laird ever sounded like the voice of the generals. He chronically protested Robert McNamara's "imposition" of civilian judgment on the Joint Chiefs. With such a bias in charge of the Pentagon, where, pray, would lie the doctrine of civilian control?

Laird had his points. "Tough" and "blunt" and "brilliant" he was called. One journalist dubbed him the "cheese-country Richelieu," but this salute to his skill at conniving only made worrywarts recall that Richelieu dragged France into the Thirty Years' War. "A scary appointment," sighed a fellow Republican when the new President let the word go forth. And up in Wisconsin, a certain Democratic lawyer crashed rhetorically to his knees, revealing the depth of his fear by the height of his appeal. Quoth he: "God help us!"

Maybe that did it. Anyway, Melvin Robert Laird, Jr., has been Secretary of Defense the better part of a year, and here we are—biologically surviving, still anxious, yet not so bleakly, feeling strangely relieved even in moments of acute dismay. Such ambivalence can be fathomed. Secretary Laird stands before us, but Congressman Laird lurks in the memory. The Secretary may scare; the Congressman habitually horrifies. Displeasure at his present stance mingles with gratitude that it is not his former. A vaguely shifting image confronts us all. Even Laird's mother ("Sort of a pacifist," he calls her) worries over his new role—in her own way. "Bam"

she calls him still, a lifelong nickname from *bambino*, pronounced "Bom" and so spelled by some, including Mel Laird. Helen Connor Laird, 81, plain hated for her Bam, 46, to end a long congressional career to take such a "terrible" job. "It will," she fears, "make a different person out of him." A mother's fear, of course, may be a nation's hope.

A look at the earlier Mel Laird suggests some difference in the present. Laird came to the House in 1953 with his conservative credentials already in rigid order, but he earned his militarist image more and more as time went by. Then he sewed it up emphatically with a 1962 book called *A House Divided: America's Strategy Gap*, a scripture that clanged like a zealous alarm, pleading a national fight-to-the-death with Communism. Author Laird scorned "mere biological survival," and yet he contended nuclear war could be survived: "One side will win, the other lose." Laird denounced "accommodations in which everything is a shade of gray, never black and white."

Disarmament? It was "incompatible" with defense. The U.S. needed the "unequivocal" will to strike—and strike first.

This doctrine Laird underscored several times, among them:

**"Step one of a military strategy of initiative should be the credible announcement of our determination to strike first if necessary to protect our vital interests."**

I recite such data not as a gratuitous act of terrorism but as a prelude to one of Laird's press conferences as Secretary of Defense. From the official transcript:

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, I'd like to ask you... about that book you wrote in 1962... At that time you advocated that we develop a first strike policy with regard to the Soviet Union, is that right?

SECRETARY LAIRD: No, I don't think that's correct. You are taking a quote that was used in the Defense Appropriations Committee report...

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, wasn't that also the time when you said there had been

too much emphasis on mere biological survival?

SECRETARY LAIRD: That may be in that book, too.

QUESTION: Is that another way of saying better dead than red?

SECRETARY LAIRD: I don't know. I don't want you to hold

me to that quote because I can't remember every quote... I have written.

Journalism prefers that politicians publicly eat their old words: wisdom is satisfied if they privately digest them. Conventional morality may instill on rage at Laird's glaring fib. But under a nobler impulse, distaste for the deception must give way to rejoicing over its motive. Seemingly, Laird was moved to disengage from certain past precommitments. The student advances by being less nettled and more informed by the mode of disengagement. A salient trait stands revealed: Public contrition is not Laird's way. He needs less the sackcloth of repentance than the cloak of consistency. Elsewhere he excused himself from the dogma of *A House Divided* through another disingenuous sidestep; he wrote the book in an era of "confrontation," he said, while now we inhabit an era of "negotiation." Times have changed, he was saying—not Mel Laird. Still, when he shies from his old words, today's Laird seems to differ from yesterday's. Perhaps the difference does not reveal as much as the fact that Laird cannot admit it exists. For sure, Laird grows almost testy at the suggestion.

I raised the possibility—the notion that in some way he has changed—at the last of three meetings with him. The effect was intriguing. His brown eyes glowered out from formidable cowlings, his left hand twirled black-rimmed specs, his right eyebrow hoisted itself, his voice quashed the idea with a resonant injunction: "I haven't changed, things have changed."

Three times he so protested, four, sitting there in his dark-blue chalkstripes, sipping a Manhattan as Washington furlled away in the twilight outside, protesting and sipping as he shifted his fleshy six-foot frame to sculpt a better slouch in the squeaky leather chair. At the far end of his gym-sized office he sat, the third-floor window wanly backlighting the cropped tufts on his pate, wild little weed patches. Suddenly the tufts whirled, the head swiftly turned. In a glance with imperious eyes at a tall, burly aide, Laird seized mimic concurrence. "Don't you see—things have changed... I haven't changed." The aide minutely nodded. Laird grinned. See? We begin to fathom this man only when we see that he must think of himself as changeless.

Among such men, theology is a private vice and semantics a chronic necessity. Through all their ravelings, theology dresses them in seamless certitude. Semantics transforms untenable dogma into habitable enigma. Laird championed "superiority" of U.S. arms. The President said a "sufficiency" would do. Inquisitors on the Hill asked Laird about the difference. Laird: "It's a question of semantics. I am not giving up the idea of maintaining a superior force in the United States." Behold: superiority = sufficiency. In his hard sell of the anti-ballistic missile, Laird surprised none while alarming nearly everybody with testimony that "there is no question about" Russia's "going for a first strike capability." Even his mother phoned to complain: "Bam, you're scaring people." In response, Laird emphasized that he was talking about the "capability" of the Russian SS-9 missile to knock out U.S. retaliatory forces. "I'm not trying to frighten people," he said. "I don't know what the Russians' intentions are. I'm talking about their capabilities. And there's a difference." Perhaps—but where does it exist? Can one vow certainty about the Russians' intended capability while professing ignorance of the intentions of which they are capable? We cannot fathom such arguments, but we can their authors. They are theologians at heart, preachers.

Mel Laird, Jr.'s remarkable disposition was all but predestined. The late Melvin R. Laird, Sr., was a preacher in fact as in heart. A Presbyterian, a World War I chaplain, he was a fist-pounding, fire-and-brim-

continued





stone man in the pulpit but kindly disposed when he stepped down—a gentle big man. “He was exactly my size, exactly,” recalls Secretary Laird, his father’s namesake though he was the third son to arrive. Bam was born in Omaha, Neb., arriving just before his father quit the active ministry at the wish of his wife Helen. She moved them back to Wisconsin when Bam was around three months, back to little Marshfield at the heart of a state whose little cities gave Thornton Wilder the memories he spun into the play *Our Town*. In Marshfield, Helen’s husband, while continuing to preach as a fill-in, entered the lumber business that had brought wealth already to her father, W. D. Connor, wealth and power (as state cop chairman, as lieutenant governor) that allowed Bam to grow up cozy in the knowledge that his family practically owned the town. School, young Laird took in a breeze. Summers, he sold vegetables, worked in a cheese factory, managed a German band. And year in and out, it is clear, he more and more became his father’s shadow. Laird volunteers little on his early years. He is not given to looking back. Yet questioning draws him forth. Listen:

“I traveled quite a bit with my father. . . . He became chairman of the county board. . . . He ran for the state Senate then when I was 18, and I made more speeches for him than he did. . . . My grandfather and father encouraged me on this. . . . Debating team. . . . I tried to be able to take either side. . . . Dad enjoyed taking opposite sides of issues. . . . Dad was a great, great reader. . . . Political heroes? I always looked up to my dad. . . . My dad and my grandfather, all the politicians would come to see them. Historically, Lincoln is my hero. . . . Dad would take me down

into that Lincoln country. . . . I never remember my house without *The New Republic*, *The Christian Century*, *Harper’s*, *Atlantic*. . . . Even though Dad would disagree with these things, we would always discuss them, and this was important. Dad would sit down on the davenport even when I was in grade school, and he would read to me out of current magazines, and we would discuss them. . . . I remember when I first had a glass of beer, around 17, and I told him that I had done that, and we visited about that. . . . He disagreed, he didn’t think that it was a good idea. . . . I had lots of discussions like that with him. . . . The concern of my father to take care of all the people who had trusted in him—that had a big effect on me. . . . And my father as a preacher had a big effect on me. I always liked to see my father preach.”

By 1946, Bam Laird had attended (at his parents’ choosing) Minnesota’s Carleton College (B.A. ’42-poly sci), had gone off to the war in which his brother Connor already had died, had been wounded in a Kamikaze attack on the Pacific destroyer he served as a Navy Lieutenant, and had returned to the States for shore duty pending his exit from service. In Wisconsin politics, it was a landmark year, 1946—the year U.S. Sen. Robert La Follette, Jr., led his waning Progressives back into the also-Wisconsin-born Republican party, and the year La Follette lost the nomination to Circuit Judge Joseph R. McCarthy. It was also Laird’s year, but darkly: His father died, leaving empty the state senate seat the son had helped win. There was never a doubt that Bam should take his dad’s place, no decision really—only a sense of inevitability. Helen Laird remembers: “Circumstances decided his career. People thought

he was prepared for it when his father died. . . . Bam was caught up in the political whirl. . . . It was a logical opening. . . . I don’t know if he would have chosen that if he had been a free agent.”

So, impelled as in some volitionless rite, Laird, Jr., took up the father’s banner. At 23, he was seated as the youngest state senator in Wisconsin history. “I won on my father’s name,” he said—and was still saying decades later. Thus a new politician was launched, thus a cherished preacher’s life was surrogated. A union of the two needed only a theology woven into political fabric. Suddenly it was at hand, falling upon the nation like a shroud.

In ’46, the cold war was about to be invented. In ’47, it was. Washington begat the Truman Doctrine, McCarthy obscurely took his Senate seat. In 1950, Dean Acheson vetoed the Truman-Stalin summit that Churchill had proposed and Russia wanted, and Joe McCarthy soared to notoriety from a remote platform in Wheeling, W. Va. By 1952, when Laird ran for Congress, Eisenhower had to stop off in Wisconsin to exchange endorsements with McCarthy. Such was the time of Laird’s political incubation. The notion of “Russia poised and yearning to attack the West” was, as George Kennan wrote, “largely a creation of the Western imagination.” It became inviolable dogma, however, merely useful to some politicians and, to others, sacred.

McCarthyites used the Red Dogma to conjure witches and flush heretics. But in Laird, no McCarthyite, the Red Dogma served a deeper psychic function: it filled the need of the preacher ever at hand. On the sacred premise of a demoniacal Red foe, Laird wrought a scripture. This is not speculation—it’s in the book:



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
*A House Divided.* Above all else this book of Laird is a religious document. As its very first principle, it states a "conviction that beyond biological existence is a quality of life, a moral order and a divine creation; that the risk of death in physical life is a secondary danger compared to the risk of death of these values and beliefs." At times, the book soars with messianic fervor: "Once millions of Americans marched to *The Battle Hymn of the Republic*—'As He died to make men holy, let us die to make men free.' This spirit, recaptured in our time when the whole world is half slave and half free, could shape the future of free humanity." This was not the language of Torquemada the heretic burner. It was the language of Urban II and Peter the Hermit, passionately firing up the Christian West for two centuries of bloody Crusades against the heathen East.

Laird's language, of course, was himself. It spoke for and of him, and it describes a man whose view of the Communist devil is not opinion drawn from evidence but dogma galvanized by faith. Once this is understood, puzzlement at his public way vanishes. Alarm that arose when Secretary Laird said Russia was going for a first strike gave way to amazement that Laird clung to his view after U.S. spy agencies said intelligence did not support it. Such amazement, of course, could rise only from the presumption that Laird's view came from data observed. In actuality, he rejects this limitation.


In fact, Laird criticized the Administrations through the '60's for basing strategy on what could be seen. In the *Congressional Record* Laird himself put the crucial word in quotations: "Our military force structure should not be related to the 'visible' threat but rather to the capabilities of the Communists. . . ." This leaves small doubt that he draws on the nonvisible, and the visible often escapes him in a most peculiar way. In the mid-60's the whole world saw the U.S.-Soviet *détente*—but not Laird. "There has not been a reduction in tensions," he said (shortly before the signing of the 1966 Moscow-New York air-service pact), "but rather a reduction in our desire to recognize Communist actions for what they are." And: "There has not been a reduction in tensions," he said in 1967 (three months after the U.S.-Soviet consular treaty and ten days before the President's Glassboro summit with Kossygin), "but rather a reduction in our desire to recognize. . . ." Word for word for word for word. A prophet appealing to highest authority invariably quotes himself.

I intend no indictment, only empathetic relief. To understand Mel Laird is to suffer him with greater tenderness, to dread the future more in compassionate terror than hateful fear. The future? Laird will push for ABM's, exalt the generals, press for MIRV's, enrich the arms trade; he will insist on more and bigger and better and deadlier gear—but none of this will be done out of crass venality or mere jingoism. He will act from the deepest truth that lies within his own world, that nonvisible world wherein somewhere across the pole there is forever an eager finger on an ultimate button; a death-hungry Communist finger longing to wipe out the perfection of life that was Marshfield long ago. The price the preacher pays for a glimpse of heaven is his perpetual belief in the imminence of hell. It seems to be the peculiar fate of 20th-century man to dwell eternally within the curlicues of thermo-nuclear fantasy, but maybe there are worse fates. We know as hostages the fantasy that is Laird's reality, and his truth goes marching on. Perhaps the unhappy part of meeting this congenial man is that finally I must believe him when, over and over again, he insists: "Things have changed . . . I haven't changed."

FRANK TRIPPETT




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## AMERICAN MILITARISM

# DEFENSE CONTRACT THE MONEY WEB

BY GERALD ASTOR LOOK SENIOR EDITOR

THE PENTAGON has long been able to jet combat troops to fight 5,000 miles from American shores if a President decided to apply kill power there. But heavy equipment—tanks, cannons, helicopters, portable bridges and trucks—all traveled slow water freight. So the word went out from the Pentagon to U.S. industry: build us a really big bird.

Lockheed won, and the droopy-winged C-5A Galaxy, 247 feet in length, is the biggest bird yet to get off the ground. In one load, the four engines will lift an M-48 bridge launcher (128,420 pounds), four quarter-ton trucks with trailers, two ambulances, two five-ton trucks with trailers, two three-quarter-ton trucks with trailers plus 52 soldiers to erect the bridge and drive the vehicles.

The C-5A gives the U.S. armed forces massive airlift power, but when it grabs its maximum gross weight of 762,000 pounds and flings itself into the air, a lot more than military hardware goes into the wild blue yonder. In the three and a half years since Lockheed got the contract, it has added 10,000 workers to its Marietta, Ga., plant. Chubby C. U. Dixon, Jr., a mason who earned \$5.55 an hour, signed on for \$3.75 an hour to stuff C-5A wings with electrical gear. "Outside, there's no vacation, no retirement, no credit, and it don't rain in here," says Dixon pointing to the 76 acres of U.S. Air Force Plant B-1.

Perhaps another 9,000 Lockheed-Georgia people who worked on other projects have moved on to the C-5A along with the new recruits. In fact, of Lockheed's \$6 million weekly payroll, approximately \$4 million goes to C-5A workers. For 15 years Gene Amos has been drawing paychecks from Lockheed. "I'm one of the lucky ones, never been laid off," says Amos, a troubleshooter on the production line. "It's a funny thing," he goes on, "but when the union's negotiating a contract, businesses in the area all seem to raise their prices just before the contract's signed. So all you keep are the fringe benefits."

Employees of Lockheed-Georgia spend their money in 85 counties, and most of them pass along their dollars in the Atlanta area and Cobb County, where Marietta is. Gray-haired Len Gilbert, director of the Cobb County Chamber of Commerce, crosses one leg over the other and says, "What does Lockheed mean to us? A heckuva lot. In 1961, a low point when they had about 13,100 employees, the total wages for a quarter in Cobb County amounted to \$33 million." He paused to locate the figures. "In the last quarter of 1968, Cobb County showed a payroll of \$85 million." Corresponding figures for 1961 and 1968 show an increase in retail sales from \$133 million to \$368 million. "A payroll dollar turns over seven times," points

out Gilbert, making the C-5A responsible for a big chunk of those sales. While the population of Marietta shows only a slight increase since the 1960 census figure of 25,000, suburban Cobb County has added 66,000 folks to the 114,000 that

lived there then. Marietta Mayor L. Howard Atherton remembers when the former tenant of the factory, Bell Aircraft, stopped making B-29's in 1945, and 32,000 people lost their jobs. "It felt like the end of

the world, but it wasn't so bad. When Bell shut down, the people left town. It was a transient population. Now, it's different. Lockheed is culturally and economically a part of Marietta. Lockheed people are much more solid, they pay their bills, participate in the community life. They couldn't just move away."

Atherton, who is a drugstore owner, believes that even in the unlikely event that Lockheed should go the way of Bell, his community would survive. "There's been so much building in the last few years, construction's had a bigger effect than Lockheed." In the next breath, Mayor Atherton calls the company "vital not only to Marietta but the whole state."



Some local citizens agree with him. The head of a jewelry outlet says business is up, and not just because of the aircraft workers. "But I often say if Lockheed goes, everything goes. Yet there is a helluva lot of new industry around." The manager of a small-loan company says, "We're not solely dependent upon Lockheed, and with Atlanta coming out this way, it wouldn't be that bad if there were a cutback."

The C-5A spins a web of money that touches far beyond Marietta-Atlanta or even the rest of Georgia. Through subcontracts, the money flows to people in 44 states plus Canada and the United Kingdom. One large satellite effort belongs to AVCO in Nashville, Tenn., which builds the 223-foot wings. AVCO also makes fuselages for Bell helicopters, wings for other Lockheed planes and metal office furniture. But the largest number of employees, 1,500, work on the droopy C-5A wing, making it, in effect, the largest project in Nashville industry. Few workers joined AVCO for this particular job—most shifted over from other assignments.

AVCO's \$125 million C-5A contract sounds like handsome business, but General Manager and Vice-President Charles Ames says, "We couldn't live on programs like the C-5A." When and if Lockheed goes ahead with the L-1011 air bus for civil transport, AVCO expects to add workers.

One smaller subcontractor operates out of an abandoned shopping center in Caldwell, N.J. Nash Controls, Inc., a subsidiary of Simmonds Precision, turns out small actuating devices. Business dropped when the Pentagon canceled production on Lockheed's Cheyenne helicopter but picked up with the C-5A. Sensitive to recent congressional rumblings on the "overrun" in the C-5A price (perhaps \$2 billion extra), Lockheed officials blame the higher costs on severe inflation in their industry and production-capacity shortages.

Whether one talks to executives, assembly-line workers or local officials, the fears of the military-industrial complex get midged shrift. "We got enough problems building the C-5A," says Gene Amos, "without worrying about that." "It's all a lot of nonsense," says AVCO's Charles Ames. "The civilians I know in the Department of Defense are very dedicated, have the highest integrity. There's no desire to perpetuate any military-industrial complex."



Contract supervisor, Lockheed's Loyd Caldwell, keeps track of performance and costs of some of the hundreds of subcontractors. "I read what newspapers say about defense costs, and also what the company says. I don't feel insecure."

PHOTOGRAPHS BY GARY RENAUD



Chamber of Commerce Director, Len Gilbert, of Cobb County, Ga., calls the defense effort "vital to the county." He points to booming retail sales and the doubling of the price per acre of land in the past five years when Lockheed expanded its work force.



Subcontract production technicians of Nash Controls in Caldwell, N.J., wire motors for equipment designed for the C-5A. Nash added employees to handle the business. Earlier, Nash had laid off hands when another Lockheed job ended.

**The product**  
Riding atop a 28-wheel herd, a C-5A Galaxy whines along a Dobbins Air Force Base runway. When airborne, it cruises at 500 mph while toting a payload of 200,000 pounds. The Air Force expects to buy a total of 115 C-5A's for \$3.2 billion, and spend \$2 billion more for hangars and other special needs.

## AMERICAN MILITARISM

# GENERALS FOR HIRE

BY BERKELEY RICE

FOR THOSE WHO HAVE trouble understanding the complexities of the military-industrial complex, one graphic illustration is the traffic in retired military officers who join the defense industry. More than 2,000 retired generals, colonels, Navy admirals and captains now work for the 100 largest defense contractors. Their numbers have tripled in the last ten years. The top ten firms employ more than half of the 2,000. Many of these had been involved in the contracting process on major weapons systems. Their decisions often meant millions of dollars to companies for whom they now work.

Sen. William Proxmire (D., Wis.) calls this a "dangerous and shocking situation." While not charging anyone with corruption, he claims the trend represents "a distinct threat to the public interest." The threat, he says, is twofold: high-ranking retired officers may be using their influence at the Pentagon to affect decisions on contracts with their companies; active officers involved in procurement may be influenced by the prospect of jobs with companies they are buying from. Defense contractors, of course, deny the charges of influence-peddling, and insist they hire ex-military men because of their expertise, and not in reward for past favors.

Despite these denials, research on the employment of retired officers reveals some intriguing patterns. Take the Minuteman II missile program, which has climbed from an original price of \$3.2 billion to \$7 billion. One of the major subcontractors is North American Aviation (\$669 million in 1968 defense contracts). Its autometrics division produces the missile's guidance system for the Air Force. Two Air Force plant representatives and a project officer for the contract recently retired and joined North American autometrics, one as division manager. Lt. Gen. W. Austin Davis, ex-chief of USAF's Ballistic Systems Division, which handled the contract, is now a vice president of North American. His chief procurement officer also joined the company, which employs a total of 104 high-ranking retired officers, including several other Air Force generals.

Asked if this employment pattern is unusual, a senior Pentagon official remarked, "It happens all the time. Almost all the officers who have anything to do with procurement go into the business. Naturally, they go to the companies they've had the most contact with. If you check the history of any missile or weapon program you'll find the same story."

The story usually ends with the Defense Department paying far more than the original estimate. When the Navy contracted with Pratt & Whitney for 2,000 engines for the controversial TF3, or F-111, the original bid was \$270,000 per engine. By 1967, when production began, the price had risen to more than \$700,000 apiece. The man who signed the pro-

duction contract was Capt. Patrick Keegan, the Navy's plant representative at Pratt & Whitney. Soon afterward, he retired from the Navy and joined P & W as special assistant to the executive vice president. Sharing his office was another special assistant, a former colonel who until his retirement had been in charge of engine purchases for the Air Force.

The problem of plant representatives is crucial, for they are the watchdogs who supposedly guard against delays, failures and cost overruns on a contract. At Marietta, Ga., where Lockheed Aircraft Corporation (\$1.8 billion in 1968 defense contracts) is turning out the giant C-5A jet transport, 230 Air Force officers watch over production. Despite all this supervision, however, the C-5A is well behind schedule, and the final price on 115 planes has climbed from the original bid of \$1.9 billion to \$3.2 billion. The fact that some of these Air Force production supervisors will probably join the 210 other retired generals and colonels at Lockheed makes one wonder about their objectivity.

There are some limits on what kind of work these men may do when they retire. Federal laws prohibit retired officers from selling to the Department of Defense for three years after retirement and to their own service for life. However, the laws are vague about what constitutes "selling." Since 1962, the Department has taken action in only one case involving a major contractor. Asked why, a Defense Department legal officer comments, "I doubt if anybody here is vigorously beating the bushes trying to discover violations of the selling laws."

Since the purpose of defense companies is to sell to the Defense Department, some observers feel the question as to which employees are engaged in sales is ridiculous. Anyway, most large firms now call their salesmen "marketing men." At defense companies, many of the marketing men are retired officers, but they do not sign the contracts.

W. T. "Pete" Higgins, a former Navy officer, is "marketing manager for naval programs" at an electronics company. "I come with the team that makes the presentation," he admits, "but only as an adviser. With my background in naval electronics, I know damn well I'm helping the company get contracts." Does this mean using his influence? "That's nonsense," says Higgins. "Anything of significance goes through ten to fifteen levels in the chain of command before a final decision. Only peanuts are settled on a single level that could be influenced by personal interest."

Helping the company get defense contracts is a popular non-selling job for high-ranking retired officers. They usually have titles like "assistant to the president" or "director of advanced planning," but they are known in the trade as "rainmakers." Regardless of how much clout they have at the Pentagon, they bring to their companies valuable inside knowledge of service plans for future weapons systems. When a general or admiral who has been involved in planning or research on a big project retires, defense contractors bid for his services as eagerly as any professional football team after a top college quarterback. When Maj. Gen. Harry Evans retired in 1967 as vice director of the Air Force's \$3 billion Manned Orbiting Laboratory program, he was immediately hired as vice president and general manager of Raytheon's Space and Information Systems Division. In 1966, Bell Aerospace Corporation, the Army's largest supplier of helicopters, hired Gen. Hamilton Howze, former chief of Army Aviation, as vice president for product planning.

Most of the large defense companies have high-

ranking ex-officers in their Washington offices. Everyone denies that they have any influence on defense contracts, but they are obviously there because they know their way around the Pentagon. One of them is Lt. Gen. William Quinn, former Army Chief of Public Information, and now in charge of "Washington operations" for Martin Marietta, which produces many of the Army's missiles. "We maintain liaison with Defense," says General Quinn, "but I don't go over to the Pentagon on any sales matters." Asked about using his influence, he admits he knows "half the people in the hierarchy over there," but claims he never uses his contacts for business. "Believe me," says Quinn, "this operation is as clean as a hound's tooth. Our real contribution is in maintaining a dialogue between our companies and the military people."

Just how retired officers can help to "maintain a dialogue" can be seen in the work of an ex-Navy officer who prefers to remain anonymous. He retired in 1968 from the Bureau of Naval Weapons, where he had been involved in the selection of contractors. He now works for one of them as a \$200-a-day consultant in Washington. "I know a lot of Navy people here," he says, "and I sort of help the company's men find their way around. The salesmen take care of selling, but if you don't have an intro like me, you waste your time with underlings who don't have any power. If I want a contract, I know exactly who to go to. Some other guys may know the technical stuff, but I know the people. That's my expertise."

Such expertise may raise questions about conflict of interest, but not to most retired officers who have joined the defense industry. Says Pete Higgins, "You take a man who retires around 45 to 50, with his kids ready for college, and he's got a problem. He can't do it on his retired pay. He's got to have a second career. Many of these men have no other marketable experience. Where the hell else do you want them to go?"

No one seems to know, but as they continue to go into the defense industry the contracting process may suffer. One Defense official claims, "the fact that these lucrative job opportunities exist cannot help but influence those who deal with defense contractors. I remember trying to hold down costs on a large contract once, and a general working with me said, 'I must be out of my mind, trying to cut the overhead on this company. I'll be part of that overhead in a few years.'"

When military men spend much of their careers dealing with companies they may eventually work for, they naturally develop some concern for the company's point of view. When 90 percent of the major defense contracts are negotiated in such a congenial atmosphere, price and the public interest can easily become secondary considerations. A normal buyer-seller relationship has a built-in check against this sort of thing, because the buyer must spend his own money. The services do not, a fact which Pentagon officials and procurement officers often seem to forget.

Despite all the criticism of defense spending, most military men look on the growing traffic between the services and the defense industry as natural and proper. An admiral who has made the transition himself claims, "It's good for the military, it's good for the company, and it's good for the country."

It's certainly good for the companies thriving on defense contracts. It may be good, or at least comforting, for the military to deal with former comrades who understand their problems and look forward to jobs in industry. But as defense costs continue to drain funds desperately needed for domestic programs, some Americans are beginning to wonder if "it" is really good for the country.

## AMERICAN MILITARISM

# THE WASTE...

BY DAVID R. MAXEY LOOK WASHINGTON EDITOR

REMEMBER ROBERT GOODLOE HARPER? No? He's the prophet who said, in 1798, "Millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute." We haven't let Bob down. Harper's hyperbole, now puffed to \$80 billion annually, is still part of the American way of life. Congress has traditionally watched domestic spending like a hawk, but focused loosely on defense. Here are some examples of looseness that have stirred interest. How do you like them?

**Dive! Dive!** In 1964, the Navy planned to buy 12 Deep Submergence Rescue Vehicles. Purpose: to lend aid to disabled submarines. Cost: \$3 million each. In June, hideous new cost estimates surfaced. Now, the Navy will buy six vehicles for \$80 million each. Cost increase: 2,666 percent. Since the 1920's, we have had one submarine accident at which the DSRV might have had a chance of being useful. One.

**The Russians were coming, the Russians were coming!** The threat of Soviet bombers in American skies caused us to build a gigantic air-defense system. One estimate of cost: \$18 billion. The Russians failed to uphold their part of the bargain by not building enough bombers to be a real threat. We should be grateful for that, because our air-defense system does not work very well. Now hear this testimony:

Senator Cannon: "In other words, the Air Defense Command agrees that if the Soviets sent over (deleted) heavy bombers now, we would only knock down (deleted) out of the (deleted)?"

Dr. Foster (of the Defense Department): "I cannot speak for the Air Defense Command, sir; but I am not the least bit surprised. (Deleted)."

Senator Cannon: "I am shocked at that."  
Senator Symington: "Incredible."

The system maligned above costs annually at least \$1.34 billion to operate, with outsiders betting on \$2 billion.

**Disingenuity waltz.** Gordon Rule, Director of Procurement Control and Clearance, U.S. Navy, told Sen. William Proxmire at a meeting of his subcommittee recently why defense-procurement programs so often cost much more than estimated: "We play games. The contractors know if they tell the Department of Defense how much a system will really cost, they'll scrub it. The Department of Defense knows if they tell the Congress the real cost, they'll scrub it. You start in with both sides knowing it's going to cost more." Proxmire shouted that was dishonest. Rule replied that he preferred to call it disingenuous.

**Ballad of Ernie Fitzgerald.** In November, 1968, A. Ernest Fitzgerald, Deputy for Management Systems for the Air Force, told the Proxmire subcommittee he estimated the Lockheed-C-5A cargo plane would cost about \$2 billion more than the Air Force had originally estimated. Pentagon executives became cross with Fitzgerald for his candor. Twelve days later, he found that his Civil Service status had been revoked. "Computer error" was blamed for giving him that status in the first place. Senator Proxmire then unearthed a memo to Assistant Secretary

of the Air Force Robert Charles. The memo discussed ways to fire Fitzgerald. Fitzgerald still has a shriveled version of his job, but cost control on large weapons procurements is not part of it. The Air Force has since verified that Fitzgerald's estimate of a \$2 billion overrun on the C-5A is very close to right. Lockheed first estimated that it would lose \$13 million on the C-5A, then allowed it might make a few bucks.

**The little helicopter that couldn't.** Helicopters are crafts of real beauty only when they work. The Cheyenne helicopter was never beautiful. It was to be a gunship, built as such from the ground up. Willis Hawkins, then Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research and Development, supported the idea. Hawkins had come to the Army in 1963 from a vice president's job at Lockheed.

It took time to decide what firm should build the Cheyenne. Experts first rated Vertol, Bell, Lockheed and Sikorsky in that order. A Source Selection group of generals made changes, rating Lockheed first, then Vertol, Sikorsky and Bell. A final pick gave the contract to Lockheed. Why? "Stronger management." "What general," rips a critic, "could rate Lockheed's management anything but high when he knows that the Assistant Secretary came from Lockheed?"

On March 23, 1966, Lockheed got the research-and-development contract. Three months later, Willis Hawkins resigned and returned to Lockheed. The first Cheyenne appeared in May, 1967, followed by nine more. Test flights began. In March, 1969, a Cheyenne off California threw three rotor blades and plunged, killing the pilot. In April, the Army threatened to cancel the contract for lack of satisfactory performance. Estimated costs had soared all the way from \$138 million to \$186 million for 15 ships. In May, 1969, the Army canceled the Cheyenne, after spending \$159 million.

**But it works on paper.** A study by Richard Stabbing of the Bureau of the Budget said we're getting worse, not better, in the design and application of electronics systems for aircraft and missiles. Stabbing listed 13 major Air Force and Navy aircraft and missiles produced since 1955, pointing out that only four had electronics systems that were over 75 percent reliable. Eleven other systems, which cost \$25 billion, sputtered below the 75 percent standard. Four programs were either canceled or phased out for low reliability. Stabbing said we'd do better to ask systems contractors to build working models rather than promising reliability based on paper estimates. He also thought competition between contractors would concentrate their minds wonderfully.

**The high cost of aborted missiles.** Sen. Stuart Symington of Missouri pointed out last March that over \$4 billion had been spent since 1944 for missiles that never got into position to be fired. They all perished during the research-and-development phase of their lives. Big as that figure is, it's smaller than if those missiles had been produced and deployed, then found to be technically sick or obsolete. Fifteen other missiles did get into position, then were scrapped. Cost: \$18.8 million.

# ... HOW TO

**VIETNAM IS A GIANT TEACHING MACHINE.** Without the mind-riveting pain it causes, we might still be leery of questioning the operations of the Department of Defense. We might still be dreaming that since our military establishment is the finest in the world, the running of it is better left to military experts, well-supplied with money.

Such dreams have faded. Congress, less afraid of being labeled unpatriotic, is asking penetrating questions. And the answers prove beyond imagining that if to err is human, the Pentagon is full of mortals. From that finding, it is only a step to asking whether we can't have sufficient defense at lower cost, and perhaps use the savings for programs with lower priorities, like healing our cities and making poverty an anachronism. The answer to the first part of that question is yes. The Defense budget can be cut without radically thinning our blood.

Some of the best thinking about the military budget has been done by Charles Schultze, former Director of the Bureau of the Budget and now a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington. Schultze, a rational man, hopes that our defense planning proceeds logically. First, we examine what our commitments around the world are. For instance, we now have in force better than 40 mutual-security agreements involving the U.S. in the defense of large chunks of Earth. Should we be all that involved? Do some pacts need rethinking? Given those commitments, what kind of fight might we get into? What threats should we plan for?

This June, Schultze reminded Sen. William Proxmire's Subcommittee on Economy in Government that our contingency planning now says that we should be able to start fighting, simultaneously, a major "NATO" war in Europe, a major war with China in Southeast Asia, and a minor scuffle in Latin America, such as our last trip to the Dominican Republic. Schultze pointedly said that the China war contingency, a \$5 billion assumption, was never debated in the Congress, even though the Defense Department has made it very, very clear that it is covering the possibility of such a war.

Once our contingencies are agreed on, Schultze said, we take the step of asking what force levels we need to handle them. How many men? Then, what weapons systems should we buy?

So. An orderly process, from commitment to contingency to force level to weapons systems. Schultze cautions that every decision along the way needs fresh scrutiny, because, for instance, the decision to be ready for two and a half wars does not make the force level needed to fight them obvious and unchangeable. Schultze delights in the example of the Navy's aircraft carriers. Currently, the Navy has 15. Why 15? One reason is that the Washington Naval Disarmament Treaty of 1921 laded out national quotas of capital ships. The U.S. got 15. After World War II, the Navy saw that the 15-battleship force was obsolete. The aircraft carrier became the new capital ship, but we cling to the magic number still.

Carriers are what one critic calls "hideously vulnerable" to air attack. They work best when the U.S. has unquestioned air superiority, such as in Vietnam. But does their vulnerability, and the number of dry-

# CUT THE BUDGET

land fields, justify having 15? If the force could be cut to 12, say, the U.S. would save about \$360 million. And the direct cost of building one new carrier is about \$540 million.

Schultze comes down hard on the military tendency, logical only in a world of limitless wars and money, to plan for every possibility, remote or not, and build forces and weapons systems to meet it.

Currently, we are planning AWACS, the Airborne Warning and Control System, to add to our existing air-defense system. The logic of air defense tortures the mind. We built the system to shield us from Russian bombers, which the Russians never really got around to building. Now, we spend to improve it in order to discourage Russia from getting around to building bombers. Proponents of AWACS say it will warn us of Kamikaze-style attacks from Soviet medium-range bombers. How likely is that? And would it feel better to know that if our cities crisp in a nuclear war, we'd be burned by missiles instead of bombers? There is, by the way, much reason to doubt that AWACS will work any better than the current system.

In June, 1968, *Congressional Quarterly*, putting civilian and military officials off the record to elicit candor, did an exhaustive reporting job on the Defense budget. *CQ* found Pentagon insiders estimating that, aside from savings on weapons systems we don't need, around \$4.2 billion could be excised by cutting the size of the armed services. That estimate did not assume an end to the Vietnam war, but only a reduction in the proportion of support troops to combatants (now about three to one), and a drop in the number of men in the "transient" category—men budgeted in excess of force requirements because they'll be traveling, not working.

Nine months later, Robert Benson, formerly of the Comptroller's Office, Defense Department, wrote in *Washington Monthly* that he saw another \$1.5 billion in savings from troop reductions in Europe. We have over 300,000 there now, plus 200,000 dependents. Benson argued that the U.S. will not send troops into Eastern Europe anyway (witness Hungary, Czechoslovakia), so the forces can be reduced without critically diluting the American presence.

Benson found further savings in people. He figures that if annual leave time for a serviceman were cut from 30 days to 20 (to more nearly match civilian vacations), it would slice manpower requirements enough to save \$450 million. Benson also proposed shortening basic training for soldiers not aimed at combat roles—that is, most of them. Saving: \$50 million a year. The Air Force and the Navy have already shortened basic training for their men. And why, asks Benson, should every Army officer be shuttled around as if he were in training to be Chief of Staff? Right now, men move on the average of once a year. Benson shows savings of \$500 million if assignment changes could be lowered by 25 percent.

Between them, Benson and the *Congressional Quarterly* staff agreed on a cut in the Defense budget of \$9 to \$10 billion a year, Vietnam or no Vietnam. Benson's estimate includes a 15 percent increase in the efficiency of defense contractors. That might take some doing.

In the broadest terms, and with examples almost

too fierce to mention, the Proxmire subcommittee found that there never has been much interest in cost control, either on the part of contractors or their customers in the armed services. Ernest Fitzgerald, who first identified the \$2 billion cost "overrun" on the Lockheed C-5A jet transport, testified that cost control is seen as "antisocial activity." He cited the case of the Mark II avionics system, a "black box" for the navigation gear and radar on the F-111 fighter-bomber. Costs on the system, experts bet, have risen from a planned \$610 million to \$2.5 billion.

In June, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, doing some digging of his own, produced a study of 12 weapons systems that showed cost overruns ranging from 0.2 percent to 124 percent on nine of them. The latter increase was on SRAM, the Air Force's Short Range Attack Missile, now expected by the Pentagon to cost \$313.9 million more than was estimated. Outsiders bet the SRAM bloat is worse than that. Laird dryly noted that \$1.4 billion of the nine overruns was due to "optimistic original cost estimates" on the part of weapons contractors.

But contractors suffer from more than simple optimism. They sometimes underestimate their costs deliberately, in order to bid low and grab a contract. This practice is called "buying in." It is based on the assumption, valid historically, that the customer services will pay the costs no matter how they creep. Former Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert Charles could not recall for Proxmire when he'd last seen a major defense contractor lose money on a contract. That, in spite of the fact that over 90 percent of all weapons systems end up costing twice what the contractors' original estimate said they would.

Fitzgerald has some ideas of how to bring an atmosphere of candor and concern for cost into the military-industrial dialogue. In the process of explaining them, he has made public a privileged language. For instance, when a manager of a weapons-system procurement finds that costs are outrunning the money Congress gave him, he has a "funding problem." In other words, costs are not too high, his funds are too low. Fitzgerald reports that since he's been in the Pentagon, he has never heard of cost reduction as an answer to a funding problem. A "credible" cost estimate is one high enough so that actual costs do not produce an embarrassing overrun.

What Fitzgerald and others are telling us is that bargaining and cost control, twist military and contractor, is not gimlet-eyed jockeying in the best sense of free enterprise. It is more the murmuring of lovers.

Fitzgerald would like to see the Pentagon use what are known as "should-cost" studies. These studies, sharp penciled by efficiency experts, try to answer what a weapons system should cost, assuming for one sweet, fleeting moment that the contractor operates in a reasonably efficient way. The Government would function as a management consultant to show the company how to hold costs down. Previous should-cost studies found considerable waste motion and superfluous workers, sometimes overstaffed up to 60 percent for the work needed. Taken together with hard-nosed devotion to economy on the part of top Pentagon officials, should-cost studies and other techniques, Fitzgerald thinks, could result in the saving

of billions. Think that over. Billions.

We should lay to rest now the notion that defense cuts would damage the economy. Arjay Miller, ex-Ford Motor Co. vice chairman, told *LOOK* Senior Editor Al Rothenberg: "I think a reduction in military expenditures . . . would have a plus effect on the economy. When rumors of peace break out, the stock market goes up. . . ."

If the Pentagon moves sharply to slash costs, the size of the Defense budget will depend all the more on the decisions made in the White House and Congress about how ambitious the country's defense policy should be. Charles Schultze is not impressed with the idea that a well-organized military-industrial complex has been siphoning cash out of the Treasury with evil design. Rather, he said, the American people "have pretty much been willing to buy anything carrying the label 'Needed For National Security.'" Schultze talked about involving the Bureau of the Budget, traditionally the President's watchdog, more deeply in the writing of the Defense budget. Previously, the Department of Defense was less scrutinized than any other Cabinet department. President Richard Nixon recently took Schultze up on that, giving Budget Director Robert Mayo what Mayo called his "marching orders" to examine Defense thoroughly.

All the talk of cost-cutting now, of reducing the Defense budget, echoes down the road to a time when the bad dream of Vietnam will be over. Then, we will find out what kind of "peace dividend" we'll get, i.e., how much money will be available for use in domestic programs or for paying out to taxpayers in the form of lower taxes. Projecting tax gains from a growing economy and the savings from not being in Vietnam against the automatic increases in domestic programs and the growth in non-Vietnam defense spending, Schultze forecast a cumulative fiscal dividend of \$35 billion by 1974. That sounds large, until we note that increases in military spending *already planned* will use up the \$20 billion a year we save from leaving Vietnam. The Defense budget can go marching on without the war. Whatever fiscal dividend we do get will come from the gain in tax revenues from a full-tilt economy. And Schultze's projection does not include the costs of large new weapons systems, or an escalation in the arms race. Those would poison the dividend.

The Nixon Administration has already cut \$1.1 billion in expenditures from the 1970 Johnson Defense budget. Recently, the Manned Orbiting Laboratory, a project on everyone's list of extraneous matter, was unmanned. Future savings from that surgery will be at least \$1.5 billion, perhaps more. And Laird has given every indication that his study of nine weapons systems would not be the last hunt for waste.

But we also have the word of Robert Moot, Defense Department Comptroller, that the Pentagon expects no significant cutbacks below the \$80 billion budget, even after American forces move out of Vietnam. He guessed \$75 billion would be somewhere near right, unless "our commitments and our missions can be cut back." And the responsibility for thinking about that, aside from the President's, lies with a Congress now somewhat awake to the chances of saving some dollars for domestic consumption.



## AMERICAN MILITARISM

# THE UNIVERSITY ARSENAL

ANGRY STUDENTS and newly formed groups of concerned faculty are raising some tough questions on college campuses. The American multiversity, it seems, is fast on its way to becoming a docile Pentagon pet, dependent on military financing and deeply enmeshed in the defense establishment.

On March 11, more than 1,400 students crammed into Stanford University's Memorial Auditorium to demand the facts about that school's involvement in war research. (Stanford ranked 46th last year among the nation's defense research-and-development contractors.) The answers were to come from five university trustees. One was William Hewlett, president of Hewlett-Packard, whose defense sales last year totaled \$34 million. Hewlett is also a director of Chrysler (\$146 million in defense contracts) and FMC Corporation (\$185 million). Another trustee was Charles Ducommun, a director of Lockheed (\$1.9 billion).

Among the trustees who were not there were the president of Northrop Aircraft and the chairman of General Dynamics.

A trustee began, "I don't think it's fair to say that the university is participating in the war." The audience groaned. He continued, "Many people within the university are actively opposing the war."

"It's very nice," a student shouted, "to view the university as an open place where I do my thing and you do your thing, only your thing happens to be doing research on weapons of destruction and death in the name of this university."

The two-hour confrontation turned very nearly into a rout, as the trustees' answers became progressively inadequate, irrelevant and evasive. At one point, Hewlett flatly denied a charge that FMC manufactured nerve gas. The students presented evidence; Hewlett countered that his source was the president of the corporation. Finally he admitted FMC had been making nerve gas up to six months earlier.

The trustees' performance at that meeting radicalized a good many students, including Mike Sweeney, a former editor of the *Stanford Daily* who was sufficiently respected by the administration to have been appointed to two important student-faculty committees. Sweeney walked in a liberal and walked out a radical. Now he pickets and demonstrates. "I've lost all my credit with the Establishment. It doesn't matter; you no longer care that much whether your future is going to be destroyed, whether you're imprisoned, whether you'll be physically endangered—because there's no alternative."

The Stanford University trustees appoint the Board of Directors of the Stanford Research Institute. sri was created in 1946 as a nonprofit "wholly-owned subsidiary" of Stanford to "improve the standard of living and the peace and prosperity of mankind." It does nearly half its research (\$29.7 million) for the Defense Department. Ten percent of its work (\$6.2 million) is military research directly related

to Southeast Asia. sri operates top-secret counterinsurgency projects in Thailand, including a new \$1.8 million contract accepted last December. It has also done secret counterinsurgency research in Vietnam, Honduras and Peru. One classified project is summarized as "considering the advantages and disadvantages of providing U.S. operational assistance to the armed forces of the Government of Peru engaged in counterinsurgency operations."

sri's board includes:

Ernest Arbuckle, chairman. Arbuckle is a Stanford trustee, a director of Hewlett-Packard and a director of Utah Construction & Mining. Utah built B-52 bases in Thailand, and its affiliate, Marcona Corp., mines iron ore in Peru.

Edmund Littlefield, also a Stanford trustee, and president of Utah.

Malcolm MacNaughton, president of Castle & Cooke, which owns 55 percent of Thai-America Steel and 84 percent of Standard Fruit. Standard Fruit imports bananas, nearly half its supply from Honduras.

Edgar Kaiser, chairman of Kaiser Aluminum, part owner of Thai Metal Works. Kaiser also has an 80 percent interest in the phosphate deposits of the Sechura Desert in Peru.

Fred L. Hartley, president of Union Oil of California, which has drilling rights off the Thai coast.

Gardiner Symonds, chairman of Tenneco, which now has extensive concessionary rights in Indonesia.

Counterinsurgency is not the brainchild of these directors, but it protects their interests very well.

**Jerry Dick, a young physicist and father of two, is opposed to the Vietnam war.** In February, at a meeting sponsored by the Stanford chapter of the American Association of University Professors, Dick heard sri President Charles Anderson argue that no researcher was forced to take on any project he found morally objectionable.

Dick stood up: "Sir, I was pressured into doing chemical-warfare research." That candor, he learned later, nearly cost him his security clearance.

I went looking for Dick, and an employee told me, "I think he's still here, but he may not want to see you." Couldn't I talk to him on the telephone? "Well, that might not work either. It's clear that they can bug the switchboard, and a lot of us here think they probably do."

I asked Weldon "Hoot" Gibson, executive vice president of sri, if Dick was still working there. His face flushed with anger. "I don't know. I really don't. Have you seen him? Don't bother. . . . People like that have a decision to make—do they want to support the organization or not?"

When I found Jerry Dick, he'd been fired.

William Rambo is associate dean of the Stanford School of Engineering and director of the Stanford Electronics Laboratories, target of a nine-day student sit-in in April. The labs held \$2.2 million in classified contracts, primarily in electronic-warfare research, before the faculty senate directed on April 24 that the contracts be phased out. Shocked faculty members learned meanwhile, from the sit-in students, that contract titles and summaries had been carefully edited to delete military references, apparently to facilitate approval of the contracts by a watchdog committee on classified research. "Applied Research in Electronic Warfare Techniques," for example, became "Applied Research in Electromagnetics."

Rambo is on the board of, and holds stock in, Itek, an electronics firm that held over \$80 million

in defense contracts at the end of last year.

He is also a member of several military advisory committees, including the Defense Department Advisory Group on Electronic Warfare and ecom—the Army Electronics Command. In other words, he is called upon as an expert to advise the Defense Department on the usefulness of the kinds of equipment Itek supplies.

Rambo, in all sincerity, says he wonders "how much talent we are denying the Government by this sensitivity regarding conflicts of interest."

In a 1966 memo, Hubert Heffner, then Stanford's dean of research and now Nixon's deputy science director, acknowledged that it was "not uncommon" for faculty members to be directors of private firms, and, declining to set rules, urged teachers to be "sensitive" to potential conflicts of interest. Sensitive or not, professors across the nation sit on the boards of defense industries and advise military committees.

MIT's research budget for the academic year 1967-68 was \$174 million, and 95 percent of this came from the Federal Government, with \$120 million from the Defense Department alone.

Such heavy dependence on one source worries many university administrators, including Cornell's former president, James Perkins, who warned that the "acceptance of Government work and corporate donation has been known to result in a slowing down of the university's critical faculties."

One laboratory director may already be in trouble because of his cautiously critical views. Dr. Wolfgang Panofsky, who directs the AEC-funded \$30-million-a-year Stanford Linear Accelerator Center (SLAC), believes university scientists ought to play a crucial role as an independent source of public review of defense policy: "It can't come from people



Jack Ruina, MIT vice president in charge of the Special Laboratories, was director of the Pentagon's Advanced Research Projects Agency and president of the Institute for Defense Analyses.

TEXT BY RUTH GELMIS PHOTOGRAPHS BY THOMAS R. KOENIGES



**Charles Hitch** was an Assistant Secretary of Defense under Robert McNamara. He is now president of the University of California.

who work directly for the Defense Department because they're obliged to live by official policy. It can't very well come from the contractors whose living depends on the Defense Department. So the universities are the only places with the technological expertise left. The real problem is how do you keep the universities from becoming captive in the process of furnishing this advice?" One answer, he says, is that "the livelihood of the university must in no way depend on Defense Department support."

A professor at the Center, arguing that "the director of a laboratory is not a free man," attributes SLAC's current funding difficulties to political reprisals. "This lab is not being pleasant politically anymore. Most of the people here have come out against the ABM, so the Center has begun to lose a few of its friends in Congress. And the way you get a budget increase is, you have friends on the AEC, friends on the Joint Atomic Energy Committee."

A few months ago, as if deliberately to substantiate that charge, Francisco Costagliola, who was at the time an AEC Commissioner, wrote to Stanford and MIT threatening that should the schools decide against doing classified research, he would press for withdrawal of all AEC research money.

Sidney Drell, another SLAC professor, found himself in an awkward position when he addressed the Stanford March 4 Convocation. (Stanford and more than 30 other universities held convocations that day to raise the issue of war research.) Drell carefully avoided taking a public stand on the ABM that day because he felt constrained by his position as a member of the President's Science Advisory Committee. He is an opponent of the ABM.

Money, or the lack of it, has boxed a number of university administrators into a corner. Some admit a desire to pull back from defense work and reorient research priorities, but complain there is simply no alternative source of comparable financing. The one agency specifically charged with supporting basic research, the National Science Foundation, has only

enough in its till to support 12 percent of that research. But the Defense Department, NASA and the AEC do support a good deal of basic research, partly because they can more easily get appropriations.

When pressure on the Defense Department compelled it to cut back on some of its controversial foreign-country projects, it offered to transfer \$400,000 of its own \$7.8 billion research budget to the State Department. The Department of State's current budget for research contracts is \$125,000.

Stanford's President Kenneth Pitzer complains, "Our national priorities are wrong." But when he needs funds for university research programs or expansion, where is he to go? The new Stanford Space Engineering and Science Building, for example, was made possible by grants of \$2,080,000 from NASA and \$992,000 from the Air Force.

Universities have learned that it doesn't hurt to have a Pentagon man on your staff. When the president of the California Institute of Technology, Lee A. DuBridge, left for Washington to become Nixon's Science Adviser, he was replaced by Harold Brown, then Secretary of the Air Force. Last year, Caltech received \$3.5 million from the Defense Department, much more than its entire student tuition. NASA and the AEC supplied an additional \$5 million. Caltech also operates the nearby \$214-million-a-year Jet Propulsion Laboratory for NASA.

A year ago, the University of Rochester, whose defense contracts increased from \$1 million in 1966 to \$13 million in 1968, hired as its vice president and provost, Robert L. Sproull. Sproull is the current chairman of the Defense Science Board, the top Pentagon science-advisory committee.

The University of California holds \$17 million in defense-research contracts and administers the \$250-million-a-year missile-development and testing laboratories at Livermore and Los Alamos. Its new president is a former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Charles Hitch. The university also maintains an \$80,000-a-year office in Washington.

MIT chose Jack Ruina to be vice president in charge of the Lincoln and Instrumentation laboratories, which do most of their business (\$92 million) with the Defense Department. A former Pentagon official, Ruina is a pragmatist: "You can say you'll withdraw the labs [from military work], but who's going to pay their salary?"

The heavy investment in military research has a snowballing effect. As one professor complains, "The trouble is, when you develop it, somebody will want to build it." The researcher who takes on a military contract because that's where he can most easily get funding, and then develops a new technique or weapon, frequently starts a new "spin-off" corporation to produce it. Route 128 around MIT and Harvard and the 900-acre industrial park owned by Stanford University are crowded with hundreds of aerospace and electronics spin-offs, most of them doing most of their business with the Defense Department. In recent years, 160 new firms have spun off from MIT alone.

The new corporations in turn hire university consultants (MIT professors may consult one day out of five) and graduating students. For that one-third of MIT's graduate students who support themselves as research assistants, future careers are determined by the kind of research they do while in graduate school. In 1968, 45 percent of MIT's industry-bound graduates took jobs with the top 100 prime defense contractors. Many still receive draft deferments for working in a defense plant.

Every new employee of a defense-oriented corporation has a vested interest in a swollen defense budget. His livelihood depends on it.

Half of all U.S. research and development is military in nature. Last year, the U.S. spent four times as much on chemical and biological warfare as it did on cancer research. The man who invented napalm was not a Dow employee but a Harvard professor working in a Harvard lab. Universities and non-profit research institutes received \$665 million from the Defense Department in 1968, for work on the ABM and MIRV, for research on aerial-weapons systems, antipersonnel bombs, chemical and biological warfare, incendiary weapons, counterinsurgency, and such mind-teasers as the classified contract titled "Beliefs and habits of certain foreign populations of significance for psychological operations."

Talent and funds that could be applied to problems of urban blight, disarmament, pollution, poverty, and disease are drained into newer, bigger, better weapons systems.

Dr. James Killian, chairman of the MIT Corporation (he was the nation's first presidential Science Adviser), has recommended to a Senate subcommittee that an ad hoc task force be created to review our weapons technology and strategic policies. Scientists thus "free of organizational loyalties" could make recommendations "without being constrained by any departmental commitments or biases."

Such a task force is not even in the planning stage. Right now, if the President wants a detailed study of, say, Russia's strategic capabilities vis-à-vis the U.S., he asks the Defense Department to ask the Air Force to ask the Rand Corporation to do the study. There is no large-scale civilian-supported "think tank" to which the public or Congress or the President can go directly for advice on strategic policy. The scientist's voice reaches us only after it is filtered through Pentagon agencies, supported by the military, and subjected to military interpretation.



**Dr. Harold Brown** replaced Nixon Science Adviser Lee A. DuBridge as president of the California Institute of Technology. Brown had been Secretary of the Air Force.

## AMERICAN MILITARISM: AN EPILOGUE

# OUR SECURITY LIES BEYOND WEAPONS

BY W. AVERELL HARRIMAN  
VETERAN DIPLOMAT AND  
FORMER CHIEF NEGOTIATOR AT THE PARIS PEACE TALKS

LIKE MANY OTHER AMERICANS, I am fearful about the present role of the military in our national life. Military men have as their primary responsibility the defense of the nation, and they are miscast when they are expected to be omniscient on other vital national concerns. It is in some ways unfair to ask them to accept responsibility for decisions on which they are clearly unqualified to give a balanced judgment.

I have worked closely with our military officers during the past three decades and respect them for their competence and dedication to our country. I have held many of them in the highest esteem, among them General Marshall. I vividly recall Marshall explaining to President Roosevelt that his advice was given purely from a military standpoint.

When military men advised extreme action in Vietnam, I am not sure that they fully realized the limited character of our objectives there. We are not there to win a war, but simply to stop the North from taking over the South by force, and to permit the people of the South to decide their own future. I am not sure that all those advising the President fully understand how limited our objectives are. Somehow or other, there is a feeling that we are fighting the international Communist conspiracy—rather than Vietnamese national Communists who do not want to be dominated by either Peking or Moscow. The international Communist situation is quite different today than it was in the early postwar period. During those days, I was always on the side of those wanting more arms for our nation. When South Korea was attacked, we had a military budget of only about \$14 billion, and we suffered greatly from it. But today, we have a military budget of almost \$80 billion, and have so many other requirements in our country that it is time to call a halt to our arms buildup. The war in Vietnam is an unfortunate drain on our resources, and will, I hope, be brought to an early settlement. The money we spend there is urgently needed now to reunite our own divided country.

It is not the military's job to know how that is to be done, and they cannot be expected to weigh the technological requirements of the military against the requirements in our cities. The military today are asking for new weapons that in my judgment are clearly less important than other national needs.

We obviously must maintain nuclear capability giving us a second strike force that would deter the Soviet Union or anyone else from hitting us. But that does not mean we have to be ahead in every aspect of nuclear capability, nor does it mean that we must have many times the power to overkill any enemy.

In 1941, I was in London as President Roose-

velt's representative to Prime Minister Churchill and the British Government. Even then, I was struck by the difference in the role of the military in Britain and in the U.S. The British War Cabinet consisted of the political leaders of the country, and the ministers of the armed services were not even members of it. I am not suggesting that the British military leaders were not highly respected or that their views were not given full weight. But they were given weight within the Cabinet in balance with the other problems of the British nation. The military chiefs of staff were advisers to the Cabinet. The military establishment was integrated into the policy-making procedures of the British Government. They had no contact with the Parliament, nor did they give any public expression of their views.

This is altogether different from our present procedures. Not only the Secretary of Defense but also the Chiefs of Staff go to the committees of the Congress and testify on all sorts of matters. As a result, a number of senators and congressmen get an unbalanced view of our nation's needs from military men who are responsible for only one aspect of our national concerns. What I am suggesting is that we have a group of senators and congressmen whose attention is concentrated on military needs. That is why we had one member of the Congress saying a short while back that if we turned over the Vietnam war to the soldiers, they would win it in a month.

Nothing could be more absurd than that statement. But it indicates the mind-set that some members of Congress get after steady bombardment by the views of our military. Their responsibility is the security of the nation, and they must look at the worst of everything. Those who see only the possible military threats would drive us into another world war. That is why isolated military judgments of political situations are not sound. Robert Kennedy wrote that during the Cuban missile crisis, he was struck by how often his brother's military advisers took "positions, which, if wrong, had the advantage that no one would be around at the end to know" how wrong they were.

All of us abhor Soviet repression of freedoms at home and in Czechoslovakia, and their support for Communist subversion in independent countries. But I decry the attempt that is being made today by some in the Defense Department and Congress to scare the American people into believing that the Soviets are scheming to attack us with nuclear weapons. No one knows the intention of the Kremlin, but I can speak from my Russian experience that dates back over forty years. I am convinced that the Soviets are as anxious to avoid destruction of their country by nuclear war as we are of ours.

It is particularly alarming that there appears to be a new policy in the Pentagon, to have the civilian-

directed offices of International Security Affairs and Systems Analysis support the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and not question them.

It is reassuring that the Congress is increasingly showing concern over military programs and exercising its independent judgments on decisions.

I believe that negotiations we are now starting with the Soviets to control the nuclear arms race are the most important we have ever undertaken. They can be successful if we act wisely.

From my talks with Mr. Kosygin and other Soviet officials, I am satisfied that they want to stop the nuclear arms race for two reasons. They don't want to divert further expenditures from their pressing internal needs. And they believe the U.S. and the Soviet Union should come to an understanding now to reduce the risk of nuclear war. This is a time of world opportunity—a split second in history. I have been told by my scientist friends that both sides can develop effective MIRV's (Multiple Independently-targeted Re-entry Vehicles) in a relatively short time. It is vital that agreement be reached before this occurs. We can each tell the number of missile sites the other has but we cannot know the character of warheads fitted to the missiles without detailed on-site inspection. I was very much shocked to hear that the military had gone ahead to order these multiple warheads without telling the Congress or the public that they had done so.

There are advisers in our defense establishment who are on record as opposing an agreement with the Soviet Union on nuclear restraint. They are entitled to their opinions, but it would be inexcusable if actions were taken that committed us to the arms race without the widest possible discussion. I am sure President Nixon believes that an agreement on nuclear restraint is of vital importance to our nation, and most Americans share this judgment.

It is interesting that it took eight years for the Congress and the public to understand what President Dwight Eisenhower was talking about when he warned about the military-industrial complex. It is only recently that we have begun to question the new weapons programs, the wisdom of immediate deployment of the ABM, and testing of the MIRV. Until now, the pressure from the Congress has been to appropriate more money than the Administration requested for new weapons programs. Pressure comes now in the opposite direction. The turnaround is due largely to the unpopularity of the war and the urgency of domestic needs. We are beginning to recognize the dangers of a militaristic attitude on the part of our country. Our security will not come from the number of our weapons. It will come from the strength of our moral force at home and abroad, from our economic and social strength, and from the unity of our people. END